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No. 20040848-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LORIN BLAUER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES, 
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 
Reply Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
Argument 
1. The district court lacked jurisdiction over CSRB 
In arguing that the district court had jurisdiction over CSRB, Blauer mistakenly 
equates a state agency with a lower court. Ans. Brf. at 15.1 This argument is made 
without supporting authority. Furthermore, the argument would place all state agencies 
which are administrative tribunals under the perpetual jurisdiction of the district courts, 
'"Ans. Brf." refers to Blauer's second brief, designated "Reply Brief," which is 
also an answer brief on the cross-appeal. 
without service or notice of any given controversy. But a state agency is not equivalent to 
a lower court. A state agency comes under the jurisdiction of the district court by being 
named as a party and served in compliance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(d)(l)(K). Regardless of CSRB's status as an 
administrative tribunal, CSRB was never brought within the jurisdiction of the district 
court pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus leaving the district court powerless to 
remand any aspect of the case to the CSRB.2 
Blauer alternatively argues that he can cure any deficiency by simply adding 
CSRB now. But adding CSRB would not relate back to the time of original filing since 
no identity of interest exists between CSRB and the department, which are separate state 
agencies with different legal interests in this matter. See Penrose v. Ross. 2003 UT App 
157, lfl[19-20, 71 P3d 631 (holding that addition of new party with different legal interests 
than original party did not relate back to time of original filing to avoid statute of 
limitations). Because the addition of CSRB would not relate back, any petition filed now 
against CSRB would be outside UAPA's thirty-day filing limit. Blauer could not satisfy 
the "when justice so requires" standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a) for amendment of 
pleadings where he deliberately chose not to correct his failure to name CSRB in the ten 
months which elapsed between when he was informed of the deficiency and when the 
district court granted summary judgment. R. 29-30, 61,1197-2000. 
2Nor has CSRB been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court because Blauer 
did not serve his notice of appeal on CSRB. R. 1176-77. See Gill v. Tracy. 13 P.2d 329 
(Utah 1932) (stating that, in order to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court, appellant 
must serve notice of appeal on all non-appellant parties who may be adversely affected by 
modification or reversal of the judgment). Furthermore, Blauer's opening brief lists no 
other interested parties which are not included in the caption of the brief. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(1). 
2 
2. Because the Department's decision was not final agency 
action, Blauer has no statutory right to judicial review of the 
Department's decision, standing alone 
Blauer's assertion that he properly named only the Department as the respondent3 
agency overlooks the limits on judicial review imposed by UAPA and the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act. First, UAPA provides that judicial review can only be had of 
final agency action. The Department's decision is not final agency action because it was 
preliminary to CSRB's subsequent agency action. Because the Department's decision is 
not final agency action, Blauer has no statutory right under UAPA to judicial review of 
that decision, standing alone. Second, the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act only 
authorizes judicial review of CSRB as the final administrative decision maker, not direct 
judicial review of the agencies subject to CSRB review. 
Given these statutory limits, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the 
Department's decision, standing alone. See Dep't of Envtl. Quality v. Golden Gardens 
Water Co., 2001 UT App 173, f 13,27 P.3d 579 (neither trial court nor appellate court has 
jurisdiction to review administrative decision where a party cannot demonstrate a 
statutory right to judicial review).4 
3Blauer's reliance on a joint reading of the definitions of "respondent" and 
"agency" is flawed because it is based on a definition of "respondent" that applies only to 
agency proceedings, not to a petition for judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
2(1 )(i) (West 2004). Respondent is defined only in the context of an adjudicative 
proceeding, which is, in turn, defined only as an agency action or proceeding. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-2(l)(a) (West 2004). The definition of respondent relied upon by Blauer, 
then, does not purport to apply to petition for judicial review. 
4The Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Harley Davidson v. Dep't of 
Workforce Services. 2005 UT 38, 528 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, — P.3d —, is inapplicable to 
this case because it dealt with appellate court jurisdiction to review & formal agency 
proceeding under Utah R. App. 14. The Supreme Court did not examine a district court's 
jurisdiction to review informal agency proceedings, nor did it address personal 
3 
A. Only final agency action is reviewable under UAPA and the 
Department's decision was not final agency action 
UAPA restricts judicial review to final agency action only. Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-14(l) (West 2004) (stating that a "party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action") (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15 (West 2004) 
(limiting district court jurisdiction to judicial review of "final agency actions resulting 
from informal adjudicative proceedings) (emphasis added). Moreover, UAPA does not 
apply to "internal personnel action within an agency concerning its own employees, or 
judicial review of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(l)(e) (West 2004) (emphasis 
added). 
Blauer concedes that both CSRB and the Department meet UAPA's definition of 
"agency." Ans. Brf. at 13. But between these two agencies, only CSRB is the final 
agency actor here. The Utah Supreme Court defined "final agency action" in Barker v. 
Utah Public Serv. Comm'n. 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998), as the "whole or a part" of any 
action which is "not preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to 
subsequent agency action of that agency or another agency." Id at 706 (emphasis added, 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court further explained that the 
"relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process of administrative 
decision making has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly 
process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal 
consequences will flow from the agency action." Barker at 706 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
jurisdiction or the statutory limitations to judicial review in UAPA and the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act. 
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Under this test from Barker, the internal decision by the Department here, though 
final within the Department, was not "final agency action" for purposes of UAPA. The 
Department's decision was not final agency action because the decision was merely 
"preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate" to Blauer's exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, given Blauer's statutory right to appeal the Department's 
decision to the CSRB, a superior agency. Barken 970 P.2d at 706. Furthermore, the 
Department's decision was not final agency action because direct judicial review of the 
Department's decision, without review of the CSRB decision, would "disrupt the orderly 
process of adjudication" set forth in the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which 
mandates that CSRB is the ultimate administrative decision maker. Id.; see also Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-202(l)(a) and -302(1 )(a) (West 2004). 
Only the CSRB decision meets the definition of "final" agency action in Barker. 
Indeed, Blauer's assertion that CSRB acted as a "superior agency" in denying Blauer's 
grievance is tantamount to an admission that the CSRB is the final agency actor here, not 
the Department.5 Ans. Brf. at 14. The final agency action denying Blauer's grievance 
was the CSRB's decision, not the Department's, and certainly not both. Because the 
Department's decision is not "final" agency action, the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
review it under UAPA. Because UAPA was Blauer's only basis of jurisdiction, the 
district court erred as a matter of law in not dismissing Blauer's complaint.6 
5Blauer exhausted his administrative remedies by appealing to the CSRB, yet 
argues that somehow the outcome of this exhaustion, the CSRB decision, was not the 
ultimate agency action declining his grievance. 
6Blauer's complaint cited sections 63-46b-15 and 78-3-4 as the only jurisdictional 
provisions supporting his complaint. R. 2, J4. Section 78-3-4(7)(a) states that the district 
court has jurisdiction to review "agency adjudicative proceedings" as set forth in UAPA. 
Section 63-46b-15 of UAPA limits district court jurisdiction to judicial review of final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." (Emphasis added). 
5 
Furthermore, Blauer's petition for judicial review of the Department's internal 
personnel decision was untimely as to that decision. The Department made its final 
internal decision on October 14,2003. R. 6, %L6; 204-06. Blauer did not file his petition 
for judicial review until January 7,2004, well over thirty days later. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-14(3)(a) (West 2004) (requiring a party to "file a petition for judicial review of 
final agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final 
agency action is issued"). Therefore, Blauer's petition for review of the Department's 
decision was untimely. 
B. The administrative procedures available to a career service employee 
only do not authorize direct judicial review of the employing agency 
In addition, judicial review of the Department's decision, standing alone, is not 
contemplated in the statutory scheme setting forth the administrative procedures available 
to a career service employee. The Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act sets forth the 
administrative procedures available to a career service employee, such as Blauer, to 
pursue a grievance against the state agency which is his employer. These procedures 
provide for CSRB review of certain employment disputes and judicial review of CSRB 
decisions. Blauer's underlying dispute with the Department meets the Act's definition of 
"grievance" because it is a "a complaint by a career service employee concerning any 
matter touching upon the relationship between the employee and his employer; and any 
dispute between a career service employee and his employer." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-
101(5)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added). Here, Blauer, grieved his alleged demotion and 
constructive discharge, which are appealable to all levels of grievance procedure, 
6 
including appeal to the CSRB as the "final administrative body" to review the grievance. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-202(l)(a) and -302(l)(a) (West 2004). 
As the final administrative body, CSRB is an agency separate and distinct from the 
agency whose employment decisions it reviews. See Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd.. 
834 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah App. 1992) (stating that CSRB "was established to provide state 
civil service employees with a forum for appealing personnel decisions outside the 
agency for which they work") (emphasis added); Kent v. Career Serv. Review Bd.. 860 
P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that the CSRB is an administrative agency 
whose sole purpose is reviewing other agency decisions). Once the CSRB renders its 
ultimate administrative decision, the aggrieved party - be it the employee or the 
employing agency - may seek judicial review of the CSRB's decision in accordance with 
UAPA. But neither the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act nor UAPA provides for 
direct judicial review to a career service employee of the employing agency's decision 
alone. For this Court to now conclude otherwise would be contrary to the structure of the 
grievance procedure outlined in statute. 
3. Having failed to petition DRHM to change the rule defining a 
demotion, Blauer is precluded from challenging the rule 
under the rationale of Draughon 
Despite his acknowledged failure to petition DHRM to modify its new rule 
defining demotion, Blauer improperly continues to argue that the rule should be 
invalidated under the rationale of this Court's decision in Draughon. In so doing, Blauer 
ignores both the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act ("UARA"), which precludes the 
judicial invalidation of an agency rule except on review of a petition for a rule change, 
7 
and the procedural posture of Draughon, which was properly before the Court on appeal 
from a district court's review of the denial by the employee's petition for a rule change. 
This Court should reject Blauer's invitation to excise the Draughon decision from its 
foundation, and to gloss over so basic a matter as subject matter jurisdiction. Under 
UARA, this Court should limit its review of the decision below to whether the trial court 
properly applied the DRHM rule to the facts of this case.7 The question of the validity of 
the rule itself under the Personnel Management Act was not properly before either the 
trial court or this Court. 
Blauer insinuates that the Department has raised the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction as a subterfuge to dodge the issue of whether DHRM's new rule conforms to 
the Utah Personnel Management Act. Unlike Blauer, however, who has ignored the 
jurisdictional consequences of his failure to petition DHRM for a rule change, the 
Department has addressed the question of the validity of the rule in the Brief of Appellee. 
Under Blauer's rationale, it is not the Department, but Blauer who seeks to dodge an 
issue. Moreover, this Court has the duty to determine its subject matter jurisdiction 
whether or not a party to the appeal has raised a jurisdictional challenge. 
Conclusion 
The CSRB is not perpetually subject to district court jurisdiction merely because it 
is an administrative tribunal. Rather, the CSRB must be brought under the jurisdiction of 
the district court in accordance with the service requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil 
7Of course, such a review assumes the existence of jurisdiction over Blauer's 
challenge to the CSRB decision. However, Blauer's actions have also deprived this Court 
of such jurisdiction. 
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Procedure. Because CSRB was not brought under the jurisdiction of the district court, the 
court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case to CSRB. 
In addition, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute 
because Blauer has no statutory right to judicial review of the Department's decision, 
standing alone. Blauer has no right to judicial review under UAPA because the 
Department's decision was not final agency action. Likewise, the Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures Act does not authorize direct review of the Department's decision, but only 
contemplates judicial review of CSRB as the final administrative decision maker. 
Under the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, this Court also lacks jurisdiction 
over Blauer's appeal to the extent that he contends the new DHRM rule defining 
demotion is invalid under the rationale of this Court's decision in Draughon. Unlike the 
employee in Draughon. Blauer has provided no basis on which either the court below or 
this Court may exercise jurisdiction to determine whether the new rule conforms to the 
governing statutory scheme. Assuming for the sake of argument that this Court may 
exercise jurisdiction over Blauer's grievance, this Court should limit its review to 
Blauer's contention that the trial court incorrectly applied the new DHRM rule. 
DATED this i ? l * 4 a y of July, 2005 
)EBRA J/MOORE 
J. CLIFFORD PETERSEN 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Department of Workforce Services 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT to the following this LP ^ day of July, 2005: 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorney for Lorin Blauer 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
10 
